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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
v. Bowie (1916) 123 Ark. 463, 185 S. W. 793; Am. Bonding Co. of Balti-
more v. Kelly (1916) 172 App. Div. 437, 158 N. Y. S. 812.
The plaintiff in the principal case indirectly derived some benefit from
the fulfillment by the defendant of his obligation with the third party
since the plaintiff was holding a third deed of trust on this particular
land.
As a general rule of law it is well settled that a mere promise to ful-
fill an existing obligation to the promisee does not supply consideration
for a new promise. Awe v. Gadd (1917) 179 Iowa 520, 161 N. W. 671;
Mortensen v. Knudson (1920) 189 Iowa 379, 176 N. W. 892. But when
the pre-existing liability is with a third party the courts are split over
the question. The great weight of authority in this country holds that
it is not. Devitt v. Stokes (1917) 174 Ky. 515, 192 S. W. 681; Vander-
bilt v. Schreyer (1883) 91 N. Y. 392; Schuler v. Myton (1892) 48 Kan.
282, 29 Pac. 163. These cases are based on the ground that the promisee
is doing only what he is already bound to do by the other contract.
In England such agreements are upheld. Shadwell v. Shadwell (1859)
30 L. J. C. P. (N. S.) 145; Scotson v. Pegg (1861) 6 H. & N. 295; Chei-
chester v. Cobb (1866) 14 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 433. And several American
jurisdictions are in accord with the English rule. Humes v. Decatur
Land Improvement Co. (1893) 98 Ala. 461, 473, 13 So. 368; Donnelly v.
Newbolt (1901) 94 Md. 220, 50 Atl. 513; Abbott v. Doane (1895) 163 Mass.
433, 40 N. E. 197. These decisions rest on the ground that the promisee
has derived some benefit from the contract with the third party and the
promisor has assumed an additional obligation by the second contract.
Some courts reason that he has waived his right to rescind the first con-
tract, such a forbearance being implied in the second contract. But this
argument is weak, because the law for the sake of practicability niust
deal with the question on the supposition that the obligation contained
in the first contract will continue to bind the parties. Williston advo-
cates a rule of consideration which would be in conformity with definitions
given by the courts and which would support such agreements not based
exclusively upon detriment to the promisor, but which would allow bene-
fits to the promisee to serve as an alternative. 1 Williston, Contracts
(1920 ed.) 287.
While we can see by this case that Missouri has adopted the English
ruling, the court has not given the line of reasoning upon which it has
rested its decision. C. E., '32.
CORPORATIONS-PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS-CHARTER MUST SPECIFY
WHETHER CUuLATIvE.-By statute in Missouri, R. S. Mo. (1919) sec.
10144, whether preferred stock dividends shall be cumulative or not must
be indicated in the articles of incorporation. In the case of Murphy v.
Richardson Dry Goods Co. (Mo. 1930) 31 S. W. (2d) 72, the articles of
incorporation provided that the dividends on preferred stock were to be
paid "out of the net yearly income in any one year." Immediately after
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incorporation a by-law was adopted declaring that the preferred stock
was to be cumulative. The plaintiff sued for his cumulative dividends.
Held, " . . the by-law here in question not only attempts to cover
matters which the statutes provide shall be covered by the articles of
incorporation, but, in stating that the preferred stock shall be cumula-
tive, it is in direct conflict with the plain articles of incorporation, and
to the extent of the conflict the language of the articles must prevail."
1 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) 4a; STOCKARD, MISSOURI COR-
PORATION LAW, 178; Kahn v. Bank of St. Joseph (1879) 70 Mo. 262.
As a general rule the by-laws of a corporation which are contrary to
or inconsistent with its charter, articles of association, or governing stat-
ute are ultra vires and void, even though they have been unanimously as-
sented to by the stockholders or members. 14 C. J. 362; Chicago City R. Co.
v. Allerton (1873) 18 Wall. 233; National Union v. Keefe. (1914) 263 Ill.
453, 105 N. E. 319; Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co. (1879) 78 N. Y. 159.
The principal case follows this rule, the sound public policy of which
can hardly be questioned. A contrary view would mean that the will
of the stockholders could be substituted at any time for the articles of
incorporation, and creditors and others dealing with a firm would have
no definite information to rely upon.
The unique feature of the Missouri statutory provision is that it is
unusual for state incorporation statutes to require the articles of incor-
poration in each particular case to state whether or not the preferred stock
shall be cumulative. "When preferred stock is issued it is generally speci-
fied in the certificate itself whether it is cumulative or non-cumulative.
If preferred stock is issued without any mention of whether or
not the dividends are cumulative, then the law makes them cumulative.
This is the well settled rule at common law in this country and
in England." COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) 273; Englander v. Os-
bone (1918) 261 Pa. 366, 104 Atl. 614; Lockhart v. Van Alstyne (1874)
31 Mich. 76; Elkins v. Camden R. R. (1882) 36 N. J. Eq. 233.
C. F. M., '31.
CRIMINAL LAW-HATrrUAL CRIMINALS AcT-PROHIBITION LAW VIOLA-
TION AS INVOLVING MORAL TRPITUDE.-A North Dakota statute provides
for increased punishment for subsequent felony convictions involving
moral turpitude. The appellant had been convicted of two other felonies
in other states and here pleaded guilty to a charge of engaging in liquor
traffic as a second offense. However, he challenged jurisdiction of the
court to impose any further sentence on him according to the statute on
the ground that the crime in question was not one involving moral turpi-
tude. Held, violation of a state prohibition law does involve moral turpi-
tude. State v. Malueky (N. D. 1930) 230 N. W. 735.
The concurring opinion in the instant case reasons that all felonies
as such involve moral turpitude while the dissenting opinions point out
that this could not have been the intention of the legislature, since leg-
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